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Abstract
Recent studies have shown that adversarial examples in state-
of-the-art image classifiers trained by deep neural networks
(DNN) can be easily generated when the target model is trans-
parent to an attacker, known as the white-box setting. However,
when attacking a deployed machine learning service, one can
only acquire the input-output correspondences of the target
model; this is the so-called black-box attack setting. The major
drawback of existing black-box attacks is the need for exces-
sive model queries, which may give a false sense of model
robustness due to inefficient query designs. To bridge this gap,
we propose a generic framework for query-efficient black-
box attacks. Our framework, AutoZOOM, which is short for
Autoencoder-based Zeroth Order Optimization Method, has
two novel building blocks towards efficient black-box attacks:
(i) an adaptive random gradient estimation strategy to balance
query counts and distortion, and (ii) an autoencoder that is
either trained offline with unlabeled data or a bilinear resizing
operation for attack acceleration. Experimental results suggest
that, by applying AutoZOOM to a state-of-the-art black-box
attack (ZOO), a significant reduction in model queries can be
achieved without sacrificing the attack success rate and the
visual quality of the resulting adversarial examples. In particu-
lar, when compared to the standard ZOO method, AutoZOOM
can consistently reduce the mean query counts in finding suc-
cessful adversarial examples (or reaching the same distortion
level) by at least 93% on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet
datasets, leading to novel insights on adversarial robustness.
1 Introduction
In recent years, “machine learning as a service” has offered
the world an effortless access to powerful machine learning
tools for a wide variety of tasks. For example, commercially
available services such as Google Cloud Vision API and Clar-
ifai.com provide well-trained image classifiers to the public.
One is able to upload and obtain the class prediction results
for images at hand at a low price. However, the existing and
emerging machine learning platforms and their low model-
access costs raise ever-increasing security concerns, as they
also offer an ideal environment for testing malicious attempts.
Even worse, the risks can be amplified when these services
are used to build derived products such that the inherent
security vulnerability could be leveraged by attackers.
∗equal contribution
Figure 1: AutoZOOM significantly reduces the number of
queries required to generate a successful adversarial Bagel
image from the black-box Inception-v3 model.
In many computer vision tasks, DNN models achieve the
state-of-the-art prediction accuracy and hence are widely de-
ployed in modern machine learning services. Nonetheless,
recent studies have highlighted DNNs’ vulnerability to ad-
versarial perturbations. In the white-box setting in which the
target model is entirely transparent to an attacker, visually
imperceptible adversarial images can be easily crafted to
fool a target DNN model towards misclassification by lever-
aging the input gradient information (Szegedy et al. 2014;
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015). However, in the
black-box setting in which the parameters of the deployed
model are hidden and one can only observe the input-output
correspondences of a queried example, crafting adversarial
examples requires a gradient-free (zeroth order) optimization
approach to gather necessary attack information. Figure 1
displays a prediction-evasive adversarial example crafted via
iterative model queries from a black-box DNN (the Inception-
v3 model (Szegedy et al. 2016)) trained on ImageNet.
Albeit achieving remarkable attack effectiveness by the
use of gradient estimation, current black-box attack methods,
such as (Chen et al. 2017; Nitin Bhagoji et al. 2018), are
not query-efficient since they exploit coordinate-wise gra-
dient estimation and value update, which inevitably incurs
an excessive number of model queries and may give a false
sense of model robustness due to inefficient query designs.
In this paper, we propose to tackle the preceding problem
by using AutoZOOM, an Autoencoder-based Zeroth Order
Optimization Method. AutoZOOM has two novel building
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Figure 2: Illustration of attack dimension reduction through a “decoder” in AutoZOOM for improving query efficiency in
black-box attacks. The decoder has two modes: (i) An autoencoder (AE) trained on unlabeled natural images that are different
from the attacked images and training data; (ii) a simple bilinear image resizer (BiLIN) that is applied channel-wise to extrapolate
low-dimensional feature to the original image dimension (width × height). In the latter mode, no additional training is required.
blocks: (i) a new and adaptive random gradient estimation
strategy to balance the query counts and distortion when
crafting adversarial examples, and (ii) an autoencoder that
is either trained offline on other unlabeled data, or based on
a simple bilinear resizing operation, in order to accelerate
black-box attacks. As illustrated in Figure 2, AutoZOOM
utilizes a “decoder” to craft a high-dimensional adversarial
perturbation from the (learned) low-dimensional latent-space
representation, and its query efficiency can be well explained
by the dimension-dependent convergence rate in gradient-
free optimization.
Contributions. We summarize our main contributions and
new insights on adversarial robustness as follows:
1. We propose AutoZOOM, a novel query-efficient black-box
attack framework for generating adversarial examples. Au-
toZOOM features an adaptive random gradient estimation
strategy and dimension reduction techniques (either an
offline trained autoencoder or a bilinear resizer) to reduce
attack query counts while maintaining attack effectiveness
and visual similarity. To the best of our knowledge, Au-
toZOOM is the first black-box attack using random full
gradient estimation and data-driven acceleration.
2. We use the convergence rate of zeroth-order optimiza-
tion to motivate the query efficiency of AutoZOOM and
provide an error analysis of the new gradient estimator
in AutoZOOM to the true gradient for characterizing the
trade-offs between estimation error and query counts.
3. When applied to a state-of-the-art black-box attack pro-
posed in (Chen et al. 2017), AutoZOOM attains a similar
attack success rate while achieving a significant reduction
(at least 93%) in the mean query counts required to at-
tack the DNN image classifiers for MNIST, CIFAR-10
and ImageNet. It can also fine-tune the distortion in the
post-success stage by performing finer gradient estimation.
4. In the experiments, we also find that AutoZOOM with a
simple bilinear resizer as the decoder (AutoZOOM-BiLIN)
can attain noticeable query efficiency, despite that it is still
worse than AutoZOOM with an offline trained autoen-
coder (AutoZOOM-AE). However, AutoZOOM-BiLIN is
easier to be mounted as no additional training is required.
The results also suggest an interesting finding that while
learning effective low-dimensional representations of legit-
imate images is still a challenging task, black-box attacks
using significantly less degree of freedoms (i.e., reduced
dimensions) are certainly plausible.
2 Related Work
Gradient-based adversarial attacks on DNNs fall within the
white-box setting, since acquiring the gradient with respect
to the input requires knowing the weights of the target DNN.
As a first attempt towards black-box attacks, the authors in
(Papernot et al. 2017) proposed to train a substitute model
using iterative model queries, performing white-box attacks
on the substitute model, and implementing transfer attacks to
the target model (Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016;
Liu et al. 2017). However, its attack performance can be
severely degraded due to poor attack transferability (Su et
al. 2018). Although ZOO achieves a similar attack success
rate and comparable visual quality as many white-box at-
tack methods (Chen et al. 2017), its coordinate-wise gradient
estimation requires excessive target model evaluations and
is hence not query-efficient. The same gradient estimation
technique is also used in (Nitin Bhagoji et al. 2018).
Beyond optimization-based approaches, the authors in
(Ilyas et al. 2018) proposed to use a natural evolution strat-
egy (NES) to enhance query efficiency. Although there is a
vector-wise gradient estimation step in the NES attack, we
treat it as a parallel work since its natural evolutionary step
is out of the scope of black-box attacks using zeroth-order
gradient descent. We also note that different from NES, our
AutoZOOM framework uses a theory-driven query-efficient
random-vector based gradient estimation strategy. In addition,
AutoZOOM could be applied to further improve the query
efficiency of NES, since NES does not take into account the
factor of attack dimension reduction, which is the novelty in
AutoZOOM as well as the main focus of this paper.
Under a more restricted attack setting, where only the de-
cision (top-1 prediction class) is known to an attacker, the
authors in (Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge 2018) proposed
a random-walk based attack around the decision boundary.
Such a black-box attack dispenses class prediction scores and
hence requires additional model queries. Due to space limi-
tation, we provide more background and a table comparing
existing black-box attacks in the supplementary material.
3 AutoZOOM: Background and Methods
3.1 Black-box Attack Formulation and Zeroth
Order Optimization
Throughout this paper, we focus on improving the query ef-
ficiency of gradient-estimation and gradient-descent based
black-box attacks empowered by AutoZOOM, and we con-
sider the threat model that the class prediction scores are
known to an attacker. In this setting, it suffices to denote the
target DNN as a classification function F : [0, 1]d 7→ RK
that takes a d-dimensional scaled image as its input and
yields a vector of prediction scores of all K image classes,
such as the prediction probabilities for each class. We further
consider the case of applying an entry-wise monotonic trans-
formation M(F ) to the output of F for black-box attacks,
since monotonic transformation preserves the ranking of the
class predictions and can alleviate the problem of large score
variation in F (e.g., probability to log probability).
Here we formulate black-box targeted attacks. The formu-
lation can be easily adapted to untargeted attacks. Let (x0, t0)
denote a natural image x0 and its ground-truth class label t0,
and let (x, t) denote the adversarial example of x0 and the
target attack class label t 6= t0. The problem of finding an
adversarial example can be formulated as an optimization
problem taking the generic form of
minx∈[0,1]d Dist(x,x0) + λ · Loss(x,M(F (x)), t), (1)
where Dist(x,x0) measures the distortion between x and
x0, Loss(·) is an attack objective reflecting the likelihood of
predicting t = argmaxk∈{1,...,K}[M(F (x))]k, λ is a regu-
larization coefficient, and the constraint x ∈ [0, 1]d confines
the adversarial image x to the valid image space. The distor-
tion Dist(x,x0) is often evaluated by the Lp norm defined as
Dist(x,x0) = ‖x−x0‖p = ‖δ‖p =
∑d
i=1 |δi|1/p for p ≥ 1,
where δ = x− x0 is the adversarial perturbation to x0. The
attack objective Loss(·) can be the training loss of DNNs
(Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015) or some designed
loss based on model predictions (Carlini and Wagner 2017b).
In the white-box setting, an adversarial example is gen-
erated by using downstream optimizers such as ADAM
(Kingma and Ba 2015) to solve (1); this requires the gra-
dient ∇f(x) of the objective function f(x) = Dist(x,x0) +
λ · Loss(x,M(F (x)), t) relative to the input of F via
back-propagation in DNNs. However, in the black-box set-
ting, acquiring ∇f(·) is implausible, and one can only ob-
tain the function evaluation F (·), which renders solving
(1) a zeroth order optimization problem. Recently, zeroth
order optimization approaches (Ghadimi and Lan 2013;
Nesterov and Spokoiny 2017; Liu et al. 2018) circumvent the
preceding challenge by approximating the true gradient via
function evaluations. Specifically, in black-box attacks, the
gradient estimate is applied to both gradient computation and
descent in the optimization process for solving (1).
3.2 Random Vector based Gradient Estimation
As a first attempt to enable gradient-free black-box attacks on
DNNs, the authors in (Chen et al. 2017) use the symmetric
difference quotient method (Lax and Terrell 2014) to evaluate
the gradient ∂f(x)∂xi of the i-th component by
gi =
f(x+ hei)− f(x− hei)
2h
≈ ∂f(x)
∂xi
(2)
using a small h. Here ei denotes the i-th elementary ba-
sis. Albeit contributing to powerful black-box attacks and
applicable to large networks like ImageNet, the nature of
coordinate-wise gradient estimation step in (2) must in-
cur an enormous amount of model queries and is hence
not query-efficient. For example, the ImageNet dataset has
d = 299× 299× 3 ≈ 270, 000 input dimensions, rendering
coordinate-wise zeroth order optimization based on gradient
estimation query-inefficient.
To improve query efficiency, we dispense with coordinate-
wise estimation and instead propose a scaled random full
gradient estimator of∇f(x), defined as
g = b · f(x+ βu)− f(x)
β
· u, (3)
where β > 0 is a smoothing parameter, u is a unit-length vec-
tor that is uniformly drawn at random from a unit Euclidean
sphere, and b is a tunable scaling parameter that balances the
bias and variance trade-off of the gradient estimation error.
Note that with b = 1, the gradient estimator in (3) becomes
the one used in (Duchi et al. 2015). With b = d, this estimator
becomes the one adopted in (Gao, Jiang, and Zhang 2014).
We will provide an optimal value b∗ for balancing query
efficiency and estimation error in the following analysis.
Averaged random gradient estimation. To effectively con-
trol the error in gradient estimation, we consider a more
general gradient estimator, in which the gradient estimate is
averaged over q random directions {uj}qj=1. That is,
g =
1
q
q∑
j=1
gj , (4)
where gj is a gradient estimate defined in (3) with u = uj .
The use of multiple random directions can reduce the variance
of g in (4) for convex loss functions (Duchi et al. 2015;
Liu et al. 2018).
Below we establish an error analysis of the averaged ran-
dom gradient estimator in (4) for studying the influence of the
parameters b and q on estimation error and query efficiency.
Theorem 1. Assume f : Rd 7→ R is differentiable and
its gradient ∇f(·) is L-Lipschitz1. Then the mean squared
1A function W (·) is L-Lipschitz if ‖W (w1) −W (w2)‖2 ≤
L‖w1 −w2‖2 for anyw1,w2. For DNNs with ReLU activations,
L can be derived from the model weights (Szegedy et al. 2014).
estimation error of g in (4) is upper bounded by
E‖g −∇f(x)‖22 ≤ 4(
b2
d2
+
b2
dq
+
(b− d)2
d2
)‖∇f(x)‖22
+
2q + 1
q
b2β2L2. (5)
Proof. The proof is given in the supplementary file.
Here we highlight the important implications based on
Theorem 1: (i) The error analysis holds when f is non-convex;
(ii) In DNNs, the true gradient ∇f can be viewed as the
numerical gradient obtained via back-propagation; (iii) For
any fixed b, selecting a small β (e.g., we set β = 1/d in
AutoZOOM) can effectively reduce the last error term in (5),
and we therefore focus on optimizing the first error term;
(iv) The first error term in (5) exhibits the influence of b
and q on the estimation error, and is independent of β. We
further elaborate on (iv) as follows. Fixing q and let η(b) =
b2
d2 +
b2
dq +
(b−d)2
d2 to be the coefficient of the first error term
in (5), then the optimal b that minimizes η(b) is b∗ = dq2q+d .
For query efficiency, one would like to keep q small, which
then implies b∗ ≈ q and η(b∗) ≈ 1 when the dimension
d is large. On the other hand, when q → ∞, b∗ ≈ d/2
and η(b∗) ≈ 1/2, which yields a smaller error upper bound
but is query-inefficient. We also note that by setting b = q,
the coefficient η(b) = b
2
d2 +
b2
dq +
(b−d)2
d2 ≈ 1 and thus is
independent of the dimension d and the parameter q.
Adaptive random gradient estimation. Based on Theorem
1 and our error analysis, in AutoZOOM we set b = q in
(3) and propose to use an adaptive strategy for selecting q.
AutoZOOM uses q = 1 (i.e., the fewest possible model eval-
uation) to first obtain rough gradient estimates for solving
(1) until a successful adversarial image is found. After the
initial attack success, it switches to use more accurate gradi-
ent estimates with q > 1 to fine-tune the image quality. The
trade-off between q (which is proportional to query counts)
and distortion reduction will be investigated in Section 4.
3.3 Attack Dimension Reduction via Autoencoder
Dimension-dependent convergence rate using gradient
estimation. Different from the first order convergence results,
the convergence rate of zeroth order gradient descent methods
has an additional multiplicative dimension-dependent factor
d. In the convex loss setting the rate is O(
√
d/T ), where T
is the number of iterations (Nesterov and Spokoiny 2017;
Liu et al. 2018; Gao, Jiang, and Zhang 2014; Wang et al.
2018). The same convergence rate has also been found in the
nonconvex setting (Ghadimi and Lan 2013). The dimension-
dependent convergence factor d suggests that vanilla black-
box attacks using gradient estimations can be query ineffi-
cient when the (vectorized) image dimension d is large, due
to the curse of dimensionality in convergence. This also moti-
vates us to propose using an autoencoder to reduce the attack
dimension and improve query efficiency in black-box attacks.
In AutoZOOM, we propose to perform random gradient es-
timation from a reduced dimension d′ < d to improve query
efficiency. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 2, the additive
Algorithm 1 AutoZOOM for black-box attacks on DNNs
Input: Black-box DNN model F , original example x0,
distortion measure Dist(·), attack objective Loss(·), mono-
tonic transformation M(·), decoder D(·) ∈ {AE,BiLIN},
initial coefficient λini, query budget Q
while query count ≤ Q do
1. Exploration: use x = x0 + D(δ′) and apply the
random gradient estimator in (4) with q = 1 to the down-
stream optimizer (e.g., ADAM) for solving (1) until an
initial attack is found.
2. Exploitation (post-success stage): continue to fine-
tune the adversarial perturbation D(δ′) for solving (1)
while setting q ≥ 1 in (4).
end while
Output: Least distorted successful adversarial example
perturbation to an image x0 is actually implemented through
a “decoder”D : Rd′ 7→ Rd such that x = x0+D(δ′), where
δ′ ∈ Rd′ . In other words, the adversarial perturbation δ ∈ Rd
to x0 is in fact generated from a dimension-reduced space,
with an aim of improving query efficiency due to the reduced
dimension-dependent factor in the convergence analysis. Au-
toZOOM provides two modes for such a decoder D:
• An autoencoder (AE) trained on unlabeled data that are
different from the training data to learn reconstruction from
a dimension-reduced representation. The encoder E(·) in an
AE compresses the data to a low-dimensional latent space
and the decoder D(·) reconstructs an example from its latent
representation. The weights of an AE are learned to minimize
the average L2 reconstruction error. Note that training such
an AE for black-box adversarial attacks is one-time and is
entirely offline (i.e., no model queries needed).
• A simple channel-wise bilinear image resizer (BiLIN) that
scales a small image to a large image via bilinear extrapola-
tion2. Note that no additional training is required for BiLIN.
Why AE? Our proposal of AE is motivated by the insightful
findings in (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015) that a
successful adversarial perturbation is highly relevant to some
human-imperceptible noise pattern resembling the shape of
the target class, known as the “shadow”. Since a decoder in
AE learns to reconstruct data from latent representations, it
can also provide distributional guidance for mapping adver-
sarial perturbations to generate these shadows.
We also note that for any reduced dimension d′, the setting
b∗ = q is optimal in terms of minimizing the corresponding
estimation error from Theorem 1, despite the fact that the
gradient estimation errors of different reduced dimensions
cannot be directly compared. In Section 4 we will report the
superior query efficiency in black-box attacks achieved with
the use of AE or BiLIN as the decoder, and discuss the benefit
of attack dimension reduction.
3.4 AutoZOOM Algorithm
Algorithm 1 summarizes the AutoZOOM framework towards
query-efficient black-box attacks on DNNs. We also note that
2See tf.image.resize_images, a TensorFlow example.
AutoZOOM is a general acceleration tool that is compatible
with any gradient-estimation based black-box adversarial at-
tack obeying the attack formulation in (1). It also has some
theoretical estimation error guarantees and query-efficient pa-
rameter selection based on Theorem 1. The details on adjust-
ing the regularization coefficient λ and the query parameter q
based on run-time model evaluation results will be discussed
in Section 4. Our source code is publicly available3.
4 Performance Evaluation
This section presents the experiments for assessing the per-
formance of AutoZOOM in accelerating black-box attacks
on DNNs in terms of the number of queries required for an
initial attack success and for a specific distortion level.
4.1 Distortion Measure and Attack Objective
As described in Section 3, AutoZOOM is a query-efficient
gradient-free optimization framework for solving the black-
box attack formulation in (1). In the following experiments,
we demonstrate the utility of AutoZOOM by using the same
attack formulation proposed in ZOO (Chen et al. 2017),
which uses the squared L2 norm as the distortion measure
Dist(·) and adopts the attack objective
Loss = max{max
j 6=t
log[F (x)]j − log[F (x)]t}, 0}, (6)
where this hinge function is designed for targeted black-box
attacks on the DNN model F , and the monotonic transforma-
tion M(·) = log(·) is applied to the model output.
4.2 Comparative Black-box Attack Methods
We compare AutoZOOM-AE (D = AE) and AutoZOOM-
BiLIN (D = BiLIN) with two different baselines: (i) Stan-
dard ZOO implementation4 with bilinear scaling (same as
BiLIN) for dimension reduction; (ii) ZOO+AE, which is
ZOO with AE. Note that all attacks indeed generate adversar-
ial perturbations based on the same reduced attack dimension.
4.3 Experiment Setup, Evaluation, Datasets and
AutoZOOM Implementation
We assess the performance of different attack methods on
several representative benchmark datasets, including MNIST
(LeCun et al. 1998), CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky 2009) and Im-
ageNet (Russakovsky et al. 2015). For MNIST and CIFAR-
10, we use the same DNN image classification models5 as
in (Carlini and Wagner 2017b). For ImageNet, we use the
Inception-v3 model (Szegedy et al. 2016). All experiments
were conducted using TensorFlow Machine-Learning Library
(Abadi et al. ) on machines equipped with an Intel Xeon E5-
2690v3 CPU and an Nvidia Tesla K80 GPU.
All attacks used ADAM (Kingma and Ba 2015) for solving
(1) with their estimated gradients and the same initial learning
rate 2× 10−3. On MNIST and CIFAR-10, all methods adopt
1,000 ADAM iterations. On ImageNet, ZOO and ZOO+AE
3https://github.com/IBM/Autozoom-Attack
4https://github.com/huanzhang12/ZOO-Attack
5https://github.com/carlini/nn_robust_
attacks
adopt 20,000 iterations, whereas AutoZOOM-BiLIN and
AutoZOOM-AE adopt 100,000 iterations. Note that due to
different gradient estimation methods, the query counts (i.e.,
the number of model evaluations) per iteration of a black-box
attack may vary. ZOO and ZOO+AE use the parallel gradient
update of (2) with a batch of 128 pixels, yielding 256 query
counts per iteration. AutoZOOM-BiLIN and AutoZOOM-AE
use the averaged random full gradient estimator in (4), result-
ing in q+1 query counts per iteration. For a fair comparison,
the query counts are used for performance assessment.
Query reduction ratio. We use the mean query counts of
ZOO with the smallest λini as the baseline for computing the
query reduction ratio of other methods and configurations.
TPR and initial success. We report the true positive rate
(TPR), which measures the percentage of successful attacks
fulfilling a pre-defined constraint ` on the normalized (per-
pixel) L2 distortion, as well as their query counts of first
successes. We also report the per-pixel L2 distortions of
initial successes, where an initial success refers to the first
query count that finds a successful adversarial example.
Post-success fine-tuning. When implementing AutoZOOM
in Algorithm 1, on MNIST and CIFAR-10 we find that Au-
toZOOM without fine-tuning (i.e., q = 1) already yields
similar distortion as ZOO. We note that ZOO can be viewed
as coordinate-wise fine-tuning and is thus query-inefficient.
On ImageNet, we will investigate the effect of post-success
fine-tuning on reducing distortion.
Autoencoder Training. In AutoZOOM-AE, we use convo-
lutional autoencoders for attack dimension reduction, which
are trained on unlabeled datasets that are different from the
training dataset and the attacked natural examples. The im-
plementation details are given in the supplementary material.
Dynamic Switching on λ. To adjust the regularization coef-
ficient λ in (1), in all methods we set its initial value λini ∈
{0.1, 1, 10} on MNIST and CIFAR-10, and set λini = 10 on
ImageNet. Furthermore, for balancing the distortion Dist and
the attack objective Loss in (1), we use a dynamic switching
strategy to update λ during the optimization process. Per ev-
ery S iterations, λ is multiplied by 10 times of the current
value if the attack has never been successful. Otherwise, it
divides its current value by 2. On MNIST and CIFAR-10,
we set S = 100. On ImageNet, we set S = 1, 000. At the
instance of initial success, we also reset λ = λini and the
ADAM parameters to the default values, as doing so can
empirically reduce the distortion for all attack methods.
4.4 Black-box Attacks on MNIST and CIFAR-10
For both MNIST and CIFAR-10, we randomly select 50
correctly classified images from their test sets, and perform
targeted attacks on these images. Since both datasets have
10 classes, each selected image is attacked 9 times, targeting
at all but its true class. For all attacks, the ratio of reduced
attack-space dimension to the original one (i.e., d′/d) is 25%
for MNIST and 6.25% for CIFAR-10.
Table 1 shows the performance evaluation on MNIST
with various values of λini, the initial value of the regulariza-
tion coefficient λ in (1). We use the performance of ZOO
with λini = 0.1 as a baseline for comparison. For example,
with λini = 0.1 and 10, the mean query counts required by
Table 1: Performance evaluation of black-box targeted attacks on MNIST
Method λini
Attack success
rate (ASR)
Mean query count
(initial success)
Mean query
count reduction
ratio (initial success)
Mean per-pixel
L2 distortion
(initial success)
True positive
rate (TPR)
Mean query count
with per-pixel L2
distortion ≤ 0.004
0.1 99.44% 35,737.60 0.00% 3.50×10−3 96.76% 47,342.85
ZOO 1 99.44% 16,533.30 53.74% 3.74×10−3 97.09% 31,322.44
10 99.44% 13,324.60 62.72% 4.85×10−3 96.31% 41,302.12
0.1 99.67% 34,093.95 4.60% 3.43×10−3 97.66% 44,079.92
ZOO+AE 1 99.78% 15,065.52 57.84% 3.72×10−3 98.00% 29,213.95
10 99.67% 12,102.20 66.14% 4.66×10−3 97.66% 38,795.98
0.1 99.89% 2,465.95 93.10% 4.51×10−3 96.55% 3,941.88
AutoZOOM-BiLIN 1 99.89% 879.98 97.54% 4.12×10−3 97.89% 2,320.01
10 99.89% 612.34 98.29% 4.67×10−3 97.11% 4,729.12
0.1 100.00% 2,428.24 93.21% 4.54×10−3 96.67% 3,861.30
AutoZOOM-AE 1 100.00% 729.65 97.96% 4.13×10−3 96.89% 1,971.26
10 100.00% 510.38 98.57% 4.67×10−3 97.22% 4,855.01
Table 2: Performance evaluation of black-box targeted attacks on CIFAR-10
Method λini
Attack success
rate (ASR)
Mean query count
(initial success)
Mean query
count reduction
ratio (initial success)
Mean per-pixel
L2 distortion
(initial success)
True positive
rate (TPR)
Mean query count
with per-pixel L2
distortion ≤ 0.0015
0.1 97.00% 25,538.43 0.00% 5.42×10−4 100.00% 25,568.33
ZOO 1 97.00% 11,662.80 54.33% 6.37×10−4 100.00% 11,777.18
10 97.00% 10,015.08 60.78% 8.03×10−4 100.00% 10,784.54
0.1 99.33% 19,670.96 22.98% 4.96×10−4 100.00% 20,219.42
ZOO+AE 1 99.00% 5,793.25 77.32% 6.83×10−4 99.89% 5,773.24
10 99.00% 4,892.80 80.84% 8.74×10−4 99.78% 5,378.30
0.1 99.67% 2,049.28 91.98% 1.01×10−3 98.77% 2,112.52
AutoZOOM-BiLIN 1 99.67% 813.01 96.82% 8.25×10−4 99.22% 1,005.92
10 99.33% 623.96 97.56% 9.09×10−4 98.99% 835.27
0.1 100.00% 1,523.91 94.03% 1.20×10−3 99.67% 1,752.45
AutoZOOM-AE 1 100.00% 332.43 98.70% 1.01×10−3 99.56% 345.62
10 100.00% 259.34 98.98% 1.15×10−3 99.67% 990.61
AutoZOOM-AE to attain an initial success is reduced by
93.21% and 98.57%, respectively. One can also observe
that allowing larger λini generally leads to fewer mean query
counts at the price of slightly increased distortion for the ini-
tial attack. The noticeable huge difference in the required at-
tack query counts between AutoZOOM and ZOO/ZOO+AE
validates the effectiveness of our proposed random full gradi-
ent estimator in (3), which dispenses with the coordinate-wise
gradient estimation in ZOO but still remains comparable true
positive rates, thereby greatly improving query efficiency.
For CIFAR-10, we report similar query efficiency improve-
ments as displayed in Table 2. In particular, comparing the
two query-efficient black-box attack methods (AutoZOOM-
BiLIN and AutoZOOM-AE), we find that AutoZOOM-AE is
more query-efficient than AutoZOOM-BiLIN, but at the cost
of an additional AE training step. AutoZOOM-AE achieves
the highest attack success rates (ASRs) and mean query re-
duction ratios for different values of λini. In addition, their
true positive rates (TPRs) are similar but AutoZOOM-AE
usually takes fewer query counts to reach the same L2 dis-
tortion. We note that when λini = 10, AutoZOOM-AE has a
higher TPR but also needs slightly more mean query counts
than AutoZOOM-BiLIN to reach the same L2 distortion.
This suggests that there are some adversarial examples that
are difficult for a bilinear resizer to reduce their post-success
distortions but can be handled by an AE.
4.5 Black-box Attacks on ImageNet
We selected 50 correctly classified images from the ImageNet
test set to perform random targeted attacks and set λini = 10
and the attack dimension reduction ratio to 1.15%. The re-
sults are summarized in Table 3. Note that comparing to ZOO,
AutoZOOM-AE can significantly reduce the query count re-
quired to achieve an initial success by 99.39% (or 99.35%
to reach the same L2 distortion), which is a remarkable im-
provement since this means reducing more than 2.2 million
model queries given the fact that the dimension of ImageNet
(≈ 270K) is much larger than that of MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Post-success distortion refinement. As described in Algo-
rithm 1, adaptive random gradient estimation is integrated in
AutoZOOM, offering a quick initial success in attack genera-
tion followed by a fine-tuning process to effectively reduce
the distortion. This is achieved by adjusting the gradient esti-
mate averaging parameter q in (4) in the post-success stage.
In general, averaging over more random directions (i.e., set-
ting larger q) tends to better reduce the variance of gradient
estimation error, but at the cost of increased model queries.
Figure 3 (a) shows the mean distortion against query counts
Table 3: Performance evaluation of black-box targeted attacks on ImageNet
Method Attack successrate (ASR)
Mean query count
(initial success)
Mean query
count reduction
ratio (initial success)
Mean per-pixel
L2 distortion
(initial success)
True positive
rate (TPR)
Mean query count
with per-pixel L2
distortion ≤ 0.0002
ZOO 76.00% 2,226,405.04 (2.22M) 0.00% 4.25×10−5 100.00% 2,296,293.73
ZOO+AE 92.00% 1,588,919.65 (1.58M) 28.63% 1.72×10−4 100.00% 1,613,078.27
AutoZOOM-BiLIN 100.00% 14,228.88 99.36% 1.26×10−4 100.00% 15,064.00
AutoZOOM-AE 100.00% 13,525.00 99.39% 1.36×10−4 100.00% 14,914.92
(a) Post-success distortion refinement (b) Dimension reduction v.s. query efficiency
Figure 3: (a) After initial success, AutoZOOM (here D = AE) can further decrease the distortion by setting q > 1 in (4) to trade
more query counts for smaller distortion in the converged stage, which saturates at q = 4. (b) Attack dimension reduction is
crucial to query-efficient black-box attacks. When compared to black-box attacks on the original dimension, dimension reduction
through AutoZOOM-AE reduces roughly 35-40% query counts on MNIST and CIFAR-10 and at least 95% on ImageNet.
for various choices of q in the post-success stage. The results
suggest that setting some small q but q > 1 can further de-
crease the distortion at the converged phase when compared
with the case of q = 1. Moreover, the refinement effect on
distortion empirically saturates at q = 4, implying a marginal
gain beyond this value. These findings also demonstrate that
our proposed AutoZOOM indeed strikes a balance between
distortion and query efficiency in black-box attacks.
4.6 Dimension Reduction and Query Efficiency
In addition to the motivation from the O(
√
d/T ) conver-
gence rate in zeroth-order optimization (Sec. 3.3), as a san-
ity check, we corroborate the benefit of attack dimension
reduction to query efficiency in black-box attacks by com-
paring AutoZOOM (here we use D = AE) with its alterna-
tive operated on the original (non-reduced) dimension (i.e.,
δ′ = D(δ′) = δ). Tested on all three datasets and aforemen-
tioned settings, Figure 3 (b) shows the corresponding mean
query count to initial success and the mean query reduction
ratio when λini = 10 in all three datasets. When compared
to the attack results of the original dimension, attack dimen-
sion reduction through AutoZOOM reduces roughly 35-40%
query counts on MNIST and CIFAR-10 and at least 95% on
ImageNet. This result highlights the importance of dimen-
sion reduction towards query-efficient black-box attacks. For
example, without dimension reduction, the attack on the orig-
inal ImageNet dimension cannot even be successful within
the query budge (Q = 200K queries).
4.7 Additional Remarks and Discussion
• In addition to benchmarking on initial attack success, the
query reduction ratio when reaching the same L2 distortion
can be directly computed from the last column in each table.
• The attack gain in AutoZOOM-AE versus AutoZOOM-
BiLIN could sometimes be marginal, while we also note that
there is room for improving AutoZOOM-AE by exploring
different AE models. However, we advocate AutoZOOM-
BiLIN as a practically ideal candidate for query-efficient
black-box attacks when testing model robustness, due to its
easy-to-mount nature and it has no additional training cost.
•While learning effective low-dimensional representations
of legitimate images is still a challenging task, black-box at-
tacks using significantly less degree of freedoms (i.e., reduced
dimensions), as demonstrated in this paper, are certainly plau-
sible, leading to new implications on model robustness.
5 Conclusion
AutoZOOM is a generic attack acceleration framework that
is compatible with any gradient-estimation based black-box
attack having the general formulation in (1). It adopts a new
and adaptive random full gradient estimation strategy to strike
a balance between query counts and estimation errors, and
features a decoder (AE or BiLIN) for attack dimension re-
duction and algorithmic convergence acceleration. Compared
to a state-of-the-art attack (ZOO), AutoZOOM consistently
reduces the mean query counts when attacking black-box
DNN image classifiers for MNIST, CIFAT-10 and ImageNet,
attaining at least 93% query reduction in finding initial suc-
cessful adversarial examples (or reaching the same distortion)
while maintaining a similar attack success rate. It can also
efficiently fine-tune the image distortion to maintain high
visual similarity to the original image. Consequently, Auto-
ZOOM provides novel and efficient means for assessing the
robustness of deployed machine learning models.
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Supplementary Material
A More Background on Adversarial Attacks
and Defenses
The research in generating adversarial examples to deceive
machine-learning models, known as adversarial attacks, tends
to evolve with the advance of machine-learning techniques
and new publicly available datasets. In (Lowd and Meek
2005), the authors studied adversarial attacks to linear clas-
sifiers with continuous or Boolean features. In (Biggio et
al. 2013), the authors proposed a gradient-based adversarial
attack on kernel support vector machines (SVMs). More re-
cently, gradient-based approaches are also used in adversarial
attacks on image classifiers trained by DNNs (Szegedy et al.
2014; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015). Due to space
limitation, we focus on related work in adversarial attacks
on DNNs. Interested readers may refer to the survey paper
(Biggio and Roli 2018) for more details.
Gradient-based adversarial attacks on DNNs fall within
the white-box setting, since acquiring the gradient with re-
spect to the input requires knowing the weights of the target
DNN. In principle, adversarial attacks can be formulated
as an optimization problem of minimizing the adversarial
perturbation while ensuring attack objectives. In image clas-
sification, given a natural image, an untargeted attack aims to
find a visually similar adversarial image resulting in a differ-
ent class prediction, while a targeted attack aims to find an
adversarial image leading to a specific class prediction. The
visual similarity between a pair of adversarial and natural
images is often measured by the Lp norm of their difference,
where p ≥ 1. Existing powerful white-box adversarial attacks
using L∞, L2 or L1 norms include iterative fast gradient sign
methods (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2017), Carlini
and Wagner’s (C&W) attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017b),
elastic-net attacks to DNNs (EAD) (Chen et al. 2018), etc.
Black-box adversarial attacks are practical threats to the
deployed machine-learning services. Attackers can observe
the input-output correspondences of any queried input, but
the target model parameters are completely hidden. There-
fore, gradient-based adversarial attacks are inapplicable to a
black-box setting. As a first attempt, the authors in (Paper-
not et al. 2017) proposed to train a substitute model using
iterative model queries, perform white-box attacks on the
substitute model, and leverage the transferability of adver-
sarial examples (Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016;
Liu et al. 2017) to attack the target model. However, train-
ing a representative surrogate for a DNN is challenging
due to the complicated and nonlinear classification rules of
DNNs and high dimensionality of the underlying dataset.
The performance of black-box attacks can be severely de-
graded if the adversarial examples for the substitute model
transfer poorly to the target model. To bridge this gap, the
authors in (Chen et al. 2017) proposed a black-box attack
called ZOO that directly estimates the gradient of the at-
tack objective by iteratively querying the target model. Al-
though ZOO achieves a similar attack success rate and com-
parable visual quality as many white-box attack methods,
it exploits the symmetric difference quotient method (Lax
and Terrell 2014) for coordinate-wise gradient estimation
and value update, which requires excessive target model
evaluations and is hence not query-efficient. The same gra-
dient estimation technique is also used in the later work
in (Nitin Bhagoji et al. 2018). Although acceleration tech-
niques such as importance sampling, bilinear scaling and
random feature grouping have been used in (Chen et al. 2017;
Nitin Bhagoji et al. 2018), the coordinate-wise gradient esti-
mation approach still forms a bottleneck for query efficiency.
Beyond optimization-based approaches, the authors in
(Ilyas et al. 2018) proposed to use a natural evolution strategy
(NES) to enhance query efficiency. Although there is also a
vector-wise gradient estimation step in the NES attack, we
treat it as an independent and parallel work since its natural
evolutionary step is out of the scope of black-box attacks us-
ing zeroth-order gradient descent. We also note that different
from NES, our AutoZOOM framework uses a query-efficient
random gradient estimation strategy. In addition, AutoZOOM
could be applied to further improve the query efficiency of
NES, since NES does not take into account the factor of attack
dimension reduction, which is the main focus of this paper.
Under a more restricted setting, where only the decision (top-
1 prediction class) is known to an attacker, the authors in
(Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge 2018) proposed a random-walk
based attack around the decision boundary. Such a black-box
attack dispenses class prediction scores and hence requires
additional model queries.
In this paper, we focus on improving the query efficiency
of gradient-estimation and gradient-descent based black-box
attacks and consider the threat model when the class predic-
tion scores are known to an attacker. For reader’s reference,
we compare existing black-box attacks on DNNs with Au-
toZOOM in Table S1. One unique feature of AutoZOOM is
the use of reduced attack dimension when mounting black-
box attacks, which is an unlabeled data-driven technique
(autoencoder) for attack acceleration, and has not been stud-
ied thoroughly in existing attacks. While white-box attacks
such as (Baluja and Fischer 2018) have utilized autoencoders
trained on the training data and the transparent logit represen-
tations of DNNs, we propose in this work to use autoencoders
trained on unlabeled natural data to improve query efficiency
for black-box attacks.
There has been many methods proposed for defending
adversarial attacks to DNNs. However, new defenses are
continuously weakened by follow-up attacks (Carlini and
Wagner 2017a; Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018). For in-
stance, model ensembles (Trame`r et al. 2018) were shown to
be effective against some black-box attacks, while they are
recently circumvented by advanced attack techniques (Ilyas
2018). In this paper, we focus on improving query efficiency
in attacking black-box undefended DNNs.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that the data dimension is d and we assume f to be
differentiable and its gradient ∇f to be L-Lipschitz. Fixing
β and consider a smoothed version of f :
fβ(x) =Eu[f(x+ βu)]. (S1)
Table S1: Comparison of black-box attacks on DNNs
Method Approach Modelouput
Targeted
attack
Large network
(ImageNet)
Data-driven
acceleration
(Narodytska and Kasiviswanathan 2016) local random search score X
(Papernot et al. 2017) substitute model score X
(Suya et al. 2017) acquisition via posterior score X
(Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge 2018) Gaussian perturbation decision X X
(Ilyas et al. 2018) natural evolution strategy score/decision X X
(Chen et al. 2017) coordinate-wisegradient estimation score X X
(Nitin Bhagoji et al. 2018) coordinate-wisegradient estimation score X X
AutoZOOM (this paper) Random (full)gradient estimation score X X X
Based on (Gao, Jiang, and Zhang 2014, Lemma 4.1-a), we
have the relation
∇fβ(x) = Eu
[
d
β
f(x+ βu)u
]
=
d
b
Eu [g] , (S2)
which then yields
Eu [g] =
b
d
∇fβ(x), (S3)
where we recall that g has been defined in (3). Moreover,
based on (Gao, Jiang, and Zhang 2014, Lemma 4.1-b), we
have
‖∇fβ(x)−∇f(x)‖2 ≤ βdL
2
. (S4)
Substituting (S3) into (S4), we obtain
‖E[g]− b
d
∇f(x)‖2 ≤ βbL
2
.
This then implies that
E[g] =
b
d
∇f(x) + , (S5)
where ‖‖2 ≤ bβL2 .
Once again, by applying (Gao, Jiang, and Zhang 2014,
Lemma 4.1-b), we can easily obtain that
Eu[‖g‖22] ≤
b2L2β2
2
+
2b2
d
‖∇f(x)‖22. (S6)
Now, let us consider the averaged random gradient estima-
tor in (4),
g =
1
q
q∑
i=1
gi =
b
q
q∑
i=1
f(x+ βui)− f(x)
β
ui.
Due to the properties of i.i.d. samples {ui} and (S5), we
define
v =: E[gi] =
b
d
∇f(x) + . (S7)
Moreover, we have
E[‖g‖22] =E
∥∥∥∥∥1q
q∑
i=1
(gi − v) + v
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
 (S8)
=‖v‖22 + E
∥∥∥∥∥1q
q∑
i=1
(gi − v)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2

=‖v‖22 +
1
q
E[‖g1 − v‖22] (S9)
=‖v‖22 +
1
q
E[‖g1‖22]−
1
q
‖v‖22, (S10)
where we have used the fact that E[gi] = E[g1] = v ∀ i. The
definition of v in (S7) yields
‖v‖22 ≤2
b2
d2
‖∇f(x)‖22 + 2‖‖22
≤2 b
2
d2
‖∇f(x)‖22 +
1
2
b2β2L2. (S11)
From (S6), we also obtain that for any i,
E[‖gi‖22] ≤
b2L2β2
2
+
2b2
d
‖∇f(x)‖22. (S12)
Substituting (S11) and (S12) into (S10), we obtain
E[‖g‖22] ≤‖v‖22 +
1
q
E[‖g1‖22] (S13)
≤2( b
2
d2
+
b2
dq
)‖∇f(x)‖22 +
q + 1
2q
b2L2β2. (S14)
Finally, we bound the mean squared estimation error as
E[‖g −∇f(x)‖22] ≤ 2E[‖g − v‖22] + 2‖v −∇f(x)‖22
≤ 2E[‖g‖22] + 2‖
b
d
∇f(x) + −∇f(x)‖22
≤ 4( b
2
d2
+
b2
dq
+
(b− d)2
d2
)‖∇f(x)‖22
+
2q + 1
q
b2L2β2, (S15)
which completes the proof.
Table S2: Architectures of Autoencoders in AutoZOOM
Dataset: MNIST Training MSE: 2.00×10−3
Reduction ratio / image size / feature map size: 25% / 28×28×1 / 14×14×1
Encoder: ConvReLU-16→ ConvReLU-16→MaxPool→ Conv-1
Decoder: ConvReLU-16→ Reshape-Re-U→ ConvReLU-16→ Conv-1
Dataset: CIFAR-10 Training MSE: 5.00×10−3
Reduction ratio / image size / feature map size: 6.25% / 32×32×3 / 8×8×3
Encoder: ConvReLU-16→ ConvReLU-16→MaxPool→ ConvReLU-3→MaxPool→ Conv-3
Decoder: ConvReLU-16→ Reshape-Re-U→ ConvReLU-16→ Reshape-Re-U→ ConvReLU-16→ Conv-3
Dataset: ImageNet Training MSE: 1.02×10−2
Reduction ratio / image size / feature map size: 1.15% / 299×299×3 / 32×32×3
Encoder: Reshape-Bi-D→ ConvReLU-16→ ConvReLU-16→MaxPool→ ConvReLU-3→MaxPool→ ConvReLU-3→MaxPool→ Conv-3
Decoder: ConvReLU-16→ Reshape-Re-U→ ConvReLU-16→ Reshape-Re-U→ ConvReLU-16→Reshape-Re-U→ ConvReLU-16→ Reshape-Bi-U→ Conv-3
ConvReLU-16: Convolution (16 filters, kernel size: 3×3×Dep) + ReLU activation
ConvReLU-3: Convolution (3 filters, kernel size: 3×3×Dep) + ReLU activation
Conv-3: Convolution (3 filters, kernel size: 3×3×Dep) Conv-1: Convolution (1 filter, kernel size: 3×3×Dep)
Reshape-Bi-D: Bilinear reshaping from 299×299×3 to 128×128×3
Reshape-Bi-U: Bilinear reshaping from 128×128×16 to 299×299×16
Reshape-Re-U: Reshaping by replicating pixels from U × V×Dep to 2U × 2V×Dep
Dep: a proper depth
C Architectures of Convolutional
Autoencoders in AutoZOOM
On MNIST, the convolutional autoencoder (CAE) is trained
on 50,000 randomly selected hand-written digits from the
MNIST8M dataset6. On CIFAR-10, the CAE is trained on
9,900 images selected from its test dataset. The remaining
images are used in black-box attacks. On ImageNet, all the
attacked natural images are from 10 randomly selected image
labels, and these labels are also used as the candidate attack
targets. The CAE is trained on about 9000 images from these
classes.
Table S2 shows the architectures for all the autoencoders
used in this work. Note that the autoencoders designed for
ImageNet uses bilinear scaling to transform data size from
299× 299×Dep to 128× 128×Dep, and also back from
128 × 128 × Dep to 299 × 299 × Dep. This is to allow
easy processing and handling for the autoencoder’s internal
convolutional layers.
The normalized mean squared error of our autoencoder
trained on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and 25 Imagenet is 0.0027,
0.0049 and 0.0151, respectively, which lies within a reason-
able range of compression loss.
6http://leon.bottou.org/projects/infimnist
D More Adversarial Examples of Attacking
Inception-v3 in the Black-box Setting
Figure S1 shows other adversarial examples of the Inception-
v3 model in the black-box targeted attack setting.
E Performance Evaluation of Black-box
Untargeted Attacks
Table S3 shows the attacking performance of black-box un-
targeted attacks on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet using
ZOO and AutoZOOM-BiLIN attacks on the same set of im-
ages in Section 4.5. The Loss function is defined as
Loss = max{log[F (x)]t0 −max
j 6=t0
log[F (x)]j}, 0}, (S16)
where t0 is the top-1 prediction label of a natural image x0.
We set λini = 10 and use q = 5 on MNIST and CIFAR-10
and q = 4 on ImageNet for distortion fine-tuning in the post-
attack phase. Comparing to Table 3, the number of model
queries can be further reduced since untargeted attacks only
require the adversarial images to be classified as any class
other than t0 rather than classified as a specific class t 6= t0.
(a) “French bulldog” to “traffic light” (b) “purse” to “bagel”
(c) “bagel” to “ grand piano” (d) “traffic light” to “ iPod”
Figure S1: Adversarial examples on ImageNet crafted by AutoZOOM when attacking on the Inception-v3 model in the black-box
setting with a target class selected at random. Left: original natural images. Right: adversarial examples.
Table S3: Performance evaluation of black-box untargeted attacks on different datasets. The per-pixel L2 distortion thresholds
are 0.004, 0.0015 and 5× 10−5 for MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, respectively.
Dataset Method Attack successrate (ASR)
Mean query count
(initial success)
Mean query
count reduction
ratio (initial success)
Mean per-pixel
L2 distortion
(initial success)
True positive
rate (TPR)
Mean query count
with per-pixel L2
distortion ≤ threshold
MNIST ZOO 100.00% 7856.64 0.00% 3.79×10
−3 100.00% 12392.96
AutoZOOM-BiLIN 100.00% 98.82 98.74% 4.21×10−3 100.00% 692.94
CIFAR-10 ZOO 100.00% 3957.76 0.00% 5.78×10
−4 100.00% 4644.60
AutoZOOM-BiLIN 100.00% 85.6 97.83% 6.47×10−4 100.00% 104.48
ImageNet ZOO 94.00% 271627.91 0.00% 2.32×10
−5 91.49% 334901.58
AutoZOOM-BiLIN 100.00% 1695.27 99.37% 3.02×10−5 94.00% 4639.11
